Recent empirical work on the e ects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment. We develop a model of monopsonistic competition with free entry to analyze the e ects of minimum wages, and our predictions t the empirical results closely. Under monopsonistic competition, we nd that a rise in the minimum wage a) raises employment per rm, b) causes rm exit, c) may increase or reduce industry employment. Minimum wages increase welfare if they raise industry employment, but welfare e ects are ambiguous if employment falls. Industry price and employment are inversely related if the product market is competitive. However, if rms have product market power, a minimum wage which raises industry employment can also increase prices.
Introduction
Recent empirical work on minimum wages has called into question the long accepted belief that minimum wages invariably reduce employment. Many of these studies suggest that moderate increases in the minimum wage need not reduce employment and may in fact raise employment (see Card (1992a,b) , Krueger (1994, 1998) , Katz and Krueger (1992) , and Machin and Manning (1994) ).
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These ndings are anomalous in view of the conventional theory of competitive labor markets, where minimum wages necessarily reduce employment. Although minimum wages can raise employment under monopsony (e.g., Stigler (1946) ), this is viewed as a theoretical curiosity, with limited practical relevance. Indeed, it is di cult to believe that the industries and labor markets in question, such as the fast food industry, can be characterized as monopsonies. Employers face competition from other employers, and entry and exit are important. None of the alternative theories which have been o ered explicitly analyze the implications of free entry (see Boal and Ransom (1997) for a survey of this literature).
This paper provides a consistent theoretical framework with which to analyze such labor markets. We argue that the appropriate model is monopsonistic competition, where a large number of employers compete for workers, and are able to freely enter or exit. However, di erent jobs have di erent non-wage characteristics, giving each employer market power in choosing the wage, even though she employs only a small fraction of the work-force. This monopsony power is su cient to ensure that a minimum wage raises employment in individual rms. However, competition between employers in the labor market gives rise to a wage-setting externality. This implies that the minimum wage has a rst-order negative e ect on pro ts, and hence rms exit the industry. The e ect on aggregate industry employment is ambiguous|it increases with the minimum wage if the labor market is su ciently distorted, but falls otherwise. Minimum wages raise welfare if aggregate employment increases, while welfare e ects are ambiguous if employment falls. We also analyze the price e ects of minimum wages. With a competitive product market, prices move inversely with employment. However, if rms have product market power, an increase in employment may be accompanied by an increase in price.
1 Wascher (1992, 1996) reported negative employment e ects, however, for several of their speci cations they also found insigni cant evidence that employment was reduced by the minimum wage increases.
The Model
Competitive labor market theory requires rms to be wage takers so that labor supply to the individual rm is in nitely elastic. Empirical evidence suggests that this is not realistic. Card and Krueger (1995, Ch. 11 ) summarize this evidence and conclude that the wage elasticity of labor supply is about 5:0.
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To ensure that labor supply is imperfectly elastic, we assume that di erent jobs have di erent non-wage characteristics. These include the job speci cation, hours of work, distance of the rm from the worker's home, the social environment in the workplace, etc. The importance of non-wage characteristics has been recognized in the theory of compensating di erentials. This is a theory of vertical di erentiation|some jobs are good while other jobs are bad, and wage di erentials compensate workers who take bad jobs. We nd it more convenient to assume horizontal job di erentiation|jobs are not inherently good or bad, but di erent workers have di erent preferences over non-wage characteristics. For example, some workers are sociable and like meeting customers while others are more retiring. Some workers, like Adam Smith, nd the chopping of meat a \brutal and odious business," while others may have no strong feelings, and might instead be unable to carry heavy boxes. A teenager might prefer working at the local McDonalds rather than any other low paying job if some of her friends also work there.
To model horizontal di erentiation in a simple and tractable way, we adapt the in uential model of Salop (1979) . We assume that the job characteristic space is a circle of unit circumference, along which workers are uniformly distributed. Let there be n rms in the market, who are uniformly spaced around the circle, so that the distance between adjacent rms is 1 = n . A worker who travels distance x to work in a rm incurs a \transportation cost" of tx. This cost should be interpreted as a subjective measure of the disutility the worker su ers, due to the mismatch between her preferred job characteristics and those o ered by the rm.
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A worker takes into account the wages as well as the job characteristics o ered by di erent rms.
Our desire is to construct a model with two features: a) total employment can either increase 2
The wage elasticity of the quit-rate is found to be greater than ?1:0, while the elasticity of the hiring rate is between 0:5 and 4:0. Card and Krueger (1994) also report that the restaurant industry had di culty in lling vacancies|over 200,000 vacancies (3 percent of jobs) were reported in 1988, and over 80 percent of fast-food stores had vacancies at any one point.
or decrease and b) employers must be competing with each other, in equilibrium. In order to do this we must allow for an additional dimension for worker heterogeneity, apart from \location." We do this by assuming that there is a diversity of worker's reservation wages. Assume that there is a unit mass of low reservation wage workers, with reservation wage 0, who are uniformly distributed around the circle, and a mass of high reservation wage workers, with reservation wage v > 0, who are similarly distributed. Our results extend to the general case where we have any arbitrarily large nite set of types of workers at each location. We shall focus on parameter values where, in equilibrium, all low reservation wage workers work and only some high reservation wage workers work so that both a) and b) are satis ed.
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Consider rst oligopsony where there is no free entry or exit so that n is xed. We derive the supply of labor to rm i, given that rm i o ers wage w i and all other rms o er wage w j . Every low reservation wage worker who is within distance x 0 = ( t = n + w i ? w j )=2t of rm i will prefer to work for rm i. Hence rm i's supply of 0-reservation wage workers is 2x (1) Firm i's supply of labor is increasing in w i . Unlike perfect competition, rm level labor supply is not in nitely elastic. Labor supply is also decreasing in the wage paid by other rms, w j .
The own e ect is larger than the cross e ect, due to the increase in the participation rate of high reservation wage workers. Our second assumption is that production requires xed costs|in order to produce any output at all, the rm must install a minimum level of capital, C. Evidence suggests substantial xed costs in the fast food industry|Krueger (1991) estimates that the total start up cost of a franchised restaurant in a major chain as between $400,000 and $600,000.
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Output is then given by a production function which is homogeneous of degree one in labor input L i , and capital input, over and above C, K i . Let k i = K i =L i be the ratio between additional capital and labor. 4 The appendix provides precise details of these parameter restrictions.
The franchisee typically pays a xed fee and a sizeable royalty, typically 8 percent of gross sales. Franchisees are often required to post an explicit performance bond, implying that a part of these royalty payments are e ectively xed. Establishments also have to invest in order to build up clientele, and a large fraction of total xed costs may well be sunk.
Output, Y i , is hence given by Y i = L i f(k i ), where f, which is output per unit of labor employed, is assumed to be twice di erentiable, increasing and strictly concave. Assume that capital can be freely hired at rate r, and that rms are price takers in the product market, facing a product price p, which is assumed to be xed for the moment. Let c = rC. Using rm i's rst order condition with respect to capital, pro ts can be written as
where
is the net revenue product of labor|the value of an additional worker, given that rm i can adjust capital optimally ( di ers from the marginal revenue product of labor, since the rm can adjust capital). The rm's optimal wage is an increasing (linear) function of the wage set by other rms: 
Equation 4 shows that the rm's employment rises with the minimum wage, and hence if n is xed, industry employment increases as well. Our arguments can be illustrated using Fig. 1 . An iso-pro t curve for rm i consists of pairs
ZP is one such iso-pro t curve, with points above this curve yielding lower pro ts. The position of rm i's labor supply curve depends upon the wages paid by other rms (recall equation (1)). The curve L i (w ) shows the rm's labor supply given that other rms are paying the equilibrium wage, w . The rm optimally chooses a point on its labor supply curve which is on the highest iso-pro t curve, i.e., the wage w and employment L at which its labor supply curve is tangent to the iso-pro t curve ZP . This is also the point where the rm's shadow wage curve corresponding to this labor supply, w s (w ), equals the net revenue product of labor, . When a minimum wage w m is imposed, this raises competitor wages and shifts the rm's labor supply curve inward to L i (w m ). To see that employment rises despite the inward shift in labor supply, consider L e i , which shows labor supply to the rm at any wage when all rms charge the same wage. This curve is upward sloping since higher wages raise the participation rate. Hence the minimum wage increases employment along this curve to the point L m . We now consider the e ect of a minimum wage upon pro ts, focusing on the direct e ects, on the assumption that the product price is xed (in section 4 we discuss the indirect e ects arising from price changes). Since a minimum wage raises both w i and w j , one for one, its e ect can be broken down as follows:
Evaluate this expression at w m = w , so that w i = w j = w . The envelope theorem implies that the rst term is zero. However, the second term is negative, since a rise in competitor's wages reduces labor supply to rm i. Since the minimum wage raises competitor wages, it has a rst order negative e ect on pro ts. This negative e ect under oligopsony di ers from the situation under monopsony, where the rm faces no competitor in the labor market, and hence the second term does not exist. This argument can also be seen in Fig. 1 . If the minimum wage only raised the rm's wage, without a ecting competitor wages (as under monopsony), the rm would move along the L i (w ) curve. Since this labor supply curve is tangent to the iso-pro t curve ZP at w , pro ts are reduced, but by a negligible amount if the minimum wage is close to w . However, the rise in competitor wages implies that the rm moves along the L e i curve, which is not tangent to ZP , to the point L m . Hence the negative e ect on pro ts is rst-order.
This negative externality in wage-setting is worth stressing since it does not seem to have been noticed before. Several authors (e.g., Card and Krueger (1995) , Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) ) have used the envelope theorem to argue that a minimum wage will have small direct e ects upon pro tability. As we have seen, this argument does not extend beyond the extreme case of monopsony. Wage-setting externalities arise in most models. For example, consider an e ciency wage model. If other employers o er higher wages, this reduces the cost of job-loss to the worker, resulting in lower e ort, and lower pro ts for rm i.
We now consider the implications of free-entry, rst upon the level of employment per rm, and then upon the number of rms. From Fig. 1 we can see that the e ect on employment per rm continues to be positive under free entry, and is fact greater than under oligopsony. Suppose that the market equilibrium without a minimum wage had rms making zero pro ts, i.e., the ZP curve yields zero-pro ts. With a minimum wage w m , employment rises to L m , rms make losses, and some of them exit. This increases labor supply to the remaining rms|the low reservation wage workers of exiting rms are shared between them. Exit continues until rm level employment adjusts to maintain the equality between gross pro ts, ( ? w m )L i , and the xed production cost, c. Thus under free-entry, minimum-wage/employment combinations must move north-east along the zero-pro t ZP curve, with remaining rms increasing their employment.
Under free entry a minimum wage obviously reduces the number of rms. Our analysis of pro ts implies that the impact on rm numbers must be rst order. Since the impact on employment per rm is also rst-order, we cannot derive unambiguous general conclusions about the net e ect on industry employment without some convoluted and tedious calculations. While the details of these calculations are in the Appendix, we outline the general approach and its conclusions. Given a minimum wage, w m and n rms, we can compute the associated equilibrium pro ts, m (w m ; n). Solving this for n when m = 0 yields the equilibrium number of rms, n m (w m ), as a function of the minimum wage. Industry employment, E, given a minimum wage, is the product of employment per rm and the equilibrium number of rms. The sign of this expression is the same as the sign of its numerator, and this yields two simple conclusions. First, if the minimum wage is less than the mean of the net revenue product of labor ( ) and the high reservation wage (v), aggregate employment is increasing in the minimum wage, and is decreasing otherwise. Second, if this derivative is negative at some minimum wage, it is also negative at any higher minimum wage. To gain further insight, we ask, what is the e ect of a small increase in the minimum wage relative to the unconstrained equilibrium, w ? Evaluating the derivative (6) at the point w m = w , we nd that its sign depends on ct. If ct is su ciently large, then total employment increases with a minimum wage; if ct is small, aggregate employment decreases. If either c or t is very small, the market is close to being competitive. 6 The magnitude of the product of c and t captures the extent of distortion in the labor market.
To summarize, our predictions on the e ects of a minimum wage are that i) rm level employment always increases ii) rms exit the industry, and iii) aggregate employment may increase or decrease, depending on whether the labor market is relatively distorted or not. This suggests that the positive employment e ects found using rm-level data are not necessarily inconsistent with aggregate studies, which have tended in the main to nd zero or weakly negative e ects. Indeed, our model suggests that the two sorts of study are complementary.
In the light of these results we re-examine, Card and Krueger's analysis of fast food restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. They nd that employment at the rm level increases in New Jersey, where the minimum wage was imposed, relative to Pennsylvania. This conclusion is robust to exit, since Card and Krueger are especially careful in re-sampling all New Jersey restaurants. They are unable to provide any direct evidence on entry in the two states. Instead, they relate information on the opening of McDonalds outlets between 1986 and 1991 across the US to minimum wage pressure, and nd no evidence of any signi cant negative e ect. This evidence seems less satisfactory in relation to the quality of the other evidence that they produce, and is understandable, given the di culties in measuring entry. Nevertheless, entry seems 6 If c is small, the number of rms will be large in equilibrium, and since workers do not have to`travel' very far, rms will have limited market power. Similarly if t is small, jobs are not very di erentiated, and again the market is very competitive. particularly important|if xed costs are partially sunk, then one would expect rm numbers to adjust by reduced entry rather than via increased exit.
Welfare Analysis
One advantage of our model is that we can examine the welfare e ects of minimum wages, since we have fully speci ed micro-foundations for labor supply. We now consider separately the e ects on low-reservation wage workers, the high-reservation wage workers and then producer and consumer surplus. The welfare e ects of minimum wages are closely related to the employment e ects. In particular, if employment increases with a small minimum wage, the average utility of each of the above groups rises. If employment falls, welfare e ects are ambiguous since some groups are made better-o and others worse o .
Consider rst the average utility of the low reservation wage workers. Since these workers always work, and minimum wages raise their earnings, one might expect that they would be better o ; however, if rms exit, some of them have to accept less preferred jobs, and this reduces their utility. To see the net e ect, observe that the derivative of the average utility of low reservation wage workers (U 0 ) with respect to the minimum wage is given by The denominator is always positive and hence the sign of (7) depends only on the numerator. This will be negative if the minimum wage is set very high. However, if we evaluate the numerator at w m = w , this is always positive (see Appendix). Thus the average utility of the 0-reservation wage workers is always increasing in a small but binding minimum wage, regardless of the e ect of the minimum wage on aggregate employment.
Consider next the derivative of the average utility of the high reservation wage workers with respect to the minimum wage: The rst term is negative and represents the e ect of exit on high reservation wage worker utility. The second term is positive and represents the e ect of increased wages. The sum is positive whenever employment increases as a result of the minimum wage and has an ambiguous sign when employment falls (see Appendix).
Since pro ts are zero with free entry/exit, a minimum wage has no e ect on rm welfare. Finally, since the price e ect has the opposite sign of the employment e ect (see Section 4) when the product market is competitive, consumer welfare rises when employment rises, and falls when employment falls.
Let our welfare criterion W be any weighted sum of the average utilities of the above four types of agent, with strictly positive weights. Our results imply that W increases with a small, binding minimum wage if employment increases, since in this case, the utility of each type of agent increases. Furthermore, one can also show that a minimum wage which decreases employment may still increase welfare (see Appendix). This implies an interesting conclusion about the welfare optimal minimum wage|at such a welfare optimum, employment may be decreasing in the minimum wage. It may be useful at this point to discuss one comment and interpretation of our results. Our results stems from the ine ciency of monopsonistic competition equilibrium, and it is often argued that such ine ciencies could be eliminated if we allowed rms to wage discriminate, by paying worker-speci c wages. For such wage discrimination to be perfect, rms would require complete information on individual worker preferences (i.e., on each worker's location and reservation utility in our model). This intuition does not appear to be fully correct. In related work, Bhaskar and To (1998a) analyze a model of monopolistic competition with perfect price discrimination and nd that this does not ensure e ciency. In the present paper we have assumed that the rm does not have information on worker preferences, making wage discrimination impossible. Wage discrimination may also cause morale problems. The empirical evidence shows that wage discrimination is limited and rms adopt indirect and less e ective forms of discrimination. Card and Krueger's survey of New Jersey and Pennsylvania found that about one-third of the restaurants paid recruitment bonuses ranging from $40 to $75 to employees who brought in a friend to work in the restaurant. Such bonuses are a natural means of discrimination if the 7 One cannot obtain an unambiguous characterization of the behaviour of employment at the optimum minimum wage. In particular, it is not true that employment is decreasing in the minimum wage at such an optimum as one might guess. The high reservation wage workers are unambiguously better o with raises in the minimum wage which increase employment; however, this is not necessarily true for the low reservation wage workers. Initially, for these workers, a minimum wage unambiguously increases average utility (whether employment increases or decreases). However, further increases in the minimum, accelerate the rate at which rms exit and the increase in money income is outweighed by increased disutility from increasingly suboptimal job choices. Thus employment may be either increasing or decreasing in the minimum wage at the optimum minimum wage. rm faces upward-sloping labor supply. The rm would be happy to pay the marginal employee more than the wage in order to induce her to join, provided that the rm can avoid paying this premium to all its existing employees, and recruitment bonuses avoid the morale problems associated with wage-discrimination.
Minimum Wages and Product Prices
We now relax our assumption that price is xed. Consider rst the case where rms are product market price-takers, but where the price is falling in total output. The qualitative e ect of minimum wages upon employment is unaltered. More precisely, the sign of the e ect of a minimum wage upon employment is una ected but the magnitude of this e ect is dampened. Suppose, for example, that a minimum wage raises employment. This can be thought of as an outward shift in the industry`supply curve,' and will raise industry output and reduce industry price. The fall in price reduces the net revenue product of labor, , and leads rms to reduce capital intensity. It also reduces pro ts, prompting some more rms to exit, thereby reducing the magnitude of the increase in employment. Similarly, if parameter values are such that aggregate employment falls under xed prices, the magnitude of the fall in aggregate employment will be less when prices vary. In general, the absolute magnitude of employment variations is larger if industry demand is the more elastic demand, since price varies less. The absolute magnitude of employment e ects is also larger the greater the degree of substitutability in production. 8 The prediction that price and employment co-variations are negative is contrary to Card and Krueger's ndings|both product price and employment rose in New Jersey (relative to Pennsylvania) with the increase in the minimum wage. This led critics to argue that the only explanation that is consistent with both employment and price e ects is a positive demand shock in New Jersey, invalidating Card and Krueger's`natural experiment.' We now show that this conclusion is unwarranted|prices can rise even if aggregate employment rises once we allow for rms' product market power. The basic reason is as follows: by inducing exit, minimum wages increase the product market power of rms (even as they reduce their labor market power), and this may cause a price rise, even as employment increases.
If both employment and prices are to rise with a minimum wage, one must have su cient factor substitutability in production, so that additional employment can be used in order to substitute for capital rather than increase output. Since our purpose is to demonstrate this possibility, we consider the special case when capital and labor are perfect substitutes (i.e,
Assume that the n rms produce a homogeneous good and act as Cournot competitors. Since the number of rms is nite, this is su cient to give rms some product market power. Summing over all rms' rst order conditions with respect to capital and dividing by n yields, 
This is similar to an oligopoly pricing equation; market price is a xed mark-up over marginal cost (r= ). Hence when n falls due to rm exit, the mark-up rises. More precisely, the e ect of a decrease in n upon output is given by: 
Since p > r= (price exceeds marginal cost) and the denominator is negative by our concavity assumption, this is positive. A minimum wage reduces industry output and increases price, because it induces exit by rms and increases the degree of monopoly power in the product market. This can well be associated with an increase in industry employment, under the same conditions as set out in Section 2. We have focused on the case of a linear technology since it provides the clearest results. If we allow for more general production functions, minimum wages will always raise prices whenever employment falls. When employment rises, prices may rise or fall, depending upon whether the production function allows for more or less factor substitutability.
Concluding Comments
We developed a model of the labor market which di ers signi cantly from perfect competition even though there is competition between employers and free entry. Our model hinges on two assumptions| xed costs in production and imperfectly elastic labor supply to the rm, which in turn stems from our assumption that jobs are horizontally di erentiated. The latter assumption maybe unfamiliar to labor economists, and merits more discussion. A similar assumption has a long standing in the industrial organization literature, where it is recognized that consumers may perceive products to be di erent even if these products are physically or functionally identical. There are stronger arguments for workers to di erentiate between jobs, given that the choice of jobs is more signi cant than the choice between soft-drinks. Sociologically, work is an important part of an individual's social life, and many workers' social relations are built around the work-place.
Our assumptions are related to the well developed empirical literature on compensating wage di erentials (see Rosen (1986) for a survey). The theory underlying this is one of vertical job di erentiation, where all workers agree that one job is better than another. To generate monopsony power here, one must assume that there is heterogeneity of worker preferences, i.e., compensating di erentials between jobs vary across individuals. Equilibrium wages will be always be lower in better jobs; however, labor supply to each rm will be a continuous increasing function of the wage. The extent of monopsony power that rms will have depends upon the extent of dispersion of compensating di erentials across workers, rather than their average size. However, the empirical work in this area focuses on measuring the average compensating di erential accurately, and there seems little information on the extent of dispersion, due to the di culties in estimating worker-speci c compensating di erentials from market data.
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Data on heterogeneous worker preferences is more easily elicited via survey data. McCue and Reed (1996) analyze a survey where workers were asked about their willingness to accept di erent low-wage jobs at various wages and nd \a signi cant heterogeneity in tastes" (p. 641). They calculate individual speci c compensating di erentials between each pair of jobs. The median of the absolute value of these di erentials is relatively large, ranging from $1.42 per hour to $0.43 per hour. However, the median compensating di erential is quite small, and is only 27 cents in the instance that the median of absolute values is $1.42. Individual speci c compensating di erentials are also large in relation to the level of wages paid in these jobs. Similarly, in our model, the median compensating di erential between a pair of jobs is zero, but the median of the absolute value of these di erentials can be large if the transport cost parameter t is large. Our paper points to the need for additional empirical work on the extent of heterogeneity of worker preferences, given its implications for the extent of monopsony power.
There are a number of alternative theoretical explanations for positive minimum wage e ects on employment, including e ciency wage models (Manning (1995) , and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) ) and job search models (Burdett and Mortensen (1998) ). Our main contribution as compared to the previous literature is that we are the only paper to focus on wage setting externalities and the resulting implications for rm entry and exit. We believe that our basic assumption of job heterogeneity is realistic. The resulting is model is tractable, and we are able to completely analyze the e ects of minimum wages, including welfare e ects and the e ects on product prices. Our predictions regarding the e ects of minimum wages on employment and prices are consistent with the empirical evidence. The model can also be used to analyze other issues in labor economics|see Bhaskar and To (1998b) for an application of the current model to looking at the distribution of wages in the presence of heterogeneous rms. E ect of a small binding minimum wage on aggregate employment Simplifying + v ? 2w (n ) yields + v ? 2w (n ) = 2 p ct= p 1 + 2 ? ( ? v) . This is positive if ct is su ciently large and negative if ct is small. In particular, if we substitute the lower bound on ct, we see that this is negative; it is positive if we substitute the upper-bound on ct.
Welfare e ect of a small binding minimum wage on 0-reservation wage workers.
Simplifying the numerator of (7) at w m = w yields 3ct=(1 + 2 ). This is always positive.
Welfare e ect of a small binding minimum wage on v-reservation wage workers.
Simplifying (8) The rst term within the square brackets is positive when total employment is increasing in the minimum wage (see (6)). The sum of the remaining two terms is positive by the parameter restrictions.
Overall welfare e ect of a minimum wage Let welfare be measured as W = 0 U 0 + v U v + P P S + C CS for arbitrary i > 0, i = 0; v; P; C. We will now show that even if ct is such that employment falls with w m , it can be the case that v @U v @w m > C @CS@w m . Since P S = 0 for any w m , this implies that a minimum wage can still raise welfare, even if it reduces employment.
Take ct close to but greater than ( ? v) 2 =2 (the lower-bound on ct), the rst term in the numerator of @U v =@w m is strictly negative and increases if ct is increased. Thus for some ct, the rst term is negative but arbitrarily close to zero so that employment is falling. The sum of remaining the two terms of the numerator and the denominator are positive for ct close to but greater than ( ? v) 2 =2 and is increasing as ct increases. Since the rst term can be negative and made arbitrarily close to zero and the sum of the remaining terms are strictly positive and bounded away from zero, @U v =@w m j w m =w (n ) can be positive even when employment is falling.
The employment e ect can be made arbitrarily small, and as a result, the price e ect can made be arbitrarily small and therefore the gains in high reservation wage worker welfare can outweigh the loss in consumer surplus.
